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Abstract
This paper adapts the modern workhorse model of quantitative trade theory (Eaton and Kortum,
2002) as a measurement tool to quantify the magnitudes of Switzerland’s gains from trade. I find
that the importance of single trading partners for Switzerland’s welfare is surprisingly small. The
reason are reallocation effects - if trade between Switzerland and some partner country is inhibited,
other supplier countries step into the breach so that the losses are limited. However, if one considers
groups of countries, for example the EU, the welfare effects become large. In terms of policy this
implies that whereas bilateral trade agreements may be important for particular industries per se,
their relevance lies primarily in ensuring that the Swiss trade costs remain constant relative to trade
costs within large trading blocks.
JEL classifications: F10, F11, F14
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1 Introduction
Switzerland is firmly integrated into the global trade network and the importance of international trade
for Swiss prosperity is undisputed - witness for example the intensity at which movements in the Euro-
Swiss Franc exchange rate are debated in public. This paper asks where Switzerland’s gains from trade
originate from and of what magnitudes they are. In order to answer this question a model of the global
trade network is indispensable. To see why consider an example: one observes in the data which goods
are shipped from France to Switzerland at what quantities and prices. How would Swiss imports (and
therewith Switzerland’s welfare) change if Switzerland was not allowed to trade with France? Clearly,
Switzerland would not simply stop to consume the goods previously sourced from France or start to
produce all these goods locally. Rather would most other trading partners expand the range of goods
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they deliver to Switzerland since they now do not have to compete with France in supplying these goods;
moreover the prices and quantities may change as well. Therefore, to assess the relevance of France for
Switzerland’s imports and welfare the observed trade pattern alone are not sufficient; a model describing
the change of trade pattern associated with the counterfactual situation of no trade being possible between
France and Switzerland is essential.
This paper adapts the workhorse model of modern quantitative trade theory as a measurement tool
for the Swiss gains from trade. I quantify this model using data on global trade pattern from the year
2003. Within this quantified version of the model I can then assess the effects of experiments similar
to the one described above on trade pattern and Swiss welfare. In particular I consider two types of
experiments. The first experiments ask how Swiss welfare depends on trade (imports, exports, or both
directions) between Switzerland and a particular trading partner being possible. The resulting equivalent
variations are measures for how important a country is for Switzerland’s gains from trade. The second
experiment is concerned with the effects of European economic integration. I compare a situation of
falling trade costs among EU27 countries with a situation where trade costs between Switzerland and the
EU27 countries fall by equal amounts as they fall within the EU27. I obtain starkly differing predictions.
Previously Egger, Gassebner, and Lassmann (2009) and Mohler (2010) applied the methodology
outlined in Feenstra (1994) to Switzerland. They measured by how much Switzerland’s imported varieties
grew over time and translated this into implied welfare gains (Mohler, 2010). This paper on the other
hand quantifies a model of the global economy using cross-sectional data on trade flows and assesses
the origins and magnitudes of Switzerland’s gains from trade with counterfactual experiments within the
quantified model. The advantage of this approach is its ability to capture general equilibrium effects such
as changes in the global trade pattern and changing factor prices and price indices. Therewith I can not
only assess observed changes, but also analyze hypothetical situations such as the ones discussed above.
Section 2 briefly outlines the model. Section 3 describes how I quantify the model. Section 4 presents
the results and Section 5 provides a concluding discussion of the results.
2 The Eaton and Kortum (2002) model as a measurement tool
The Structure of the Model I adapt the quantitative Ricardian model due to Eaton and Kortum
(2002) as described in Waugh (2010).1 In the following I briefly describe the model and refer the interested
reader to Waugh (2010) for further details. The model describes a world of N countries. A country i
is populated by Li agents each endowed with hi units of labor (human capital) and ki units of capital.
Labor and capital are internationally immobile, but perfectly mobile within countries.
A competitive intermediate industry produces differentiated intermediate inputs that are internation-
1Waugh (2010) used the Ricardian model to assess how much of the cross-country variation in per-capita incomes is
driven by asymmetries in trade costs.
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ally tradable using a Cobb-Douglas technology
y (j) = z (j)
(
k (j)
α
l (j)
1−α
)β
q (j)
1−β
,
where q (j) is a CES aggregator over all intermediates m ∈ [0, 1].2 Productivity is country-variety specific
and modeled as the realization of a Fréchet random variable
Pr [Zi (j) ≤ z] = exp
{−Tiz−θ} .
Ti is country specific and governs the expected productivity draw (the higher Ti the higher the expected
productivity draw) and therefore represents country i’s technology. Perfect competition and iceberg
trade costs - dni ≥ 1 units need to be shipped in i for one unit to arrive at the destination market
n - imply that the price at which country i offers variety j in the destination market n is pni (j) =
dni
(
rαi w
1−α
i
)β
P 1−βi /zi (j).
3 The importing country n sources any particular variety only from the coun-
try offering the best price. International trade therefore emerges whenever pnn (j) > mini 6=n {pni (j)}.
The final goods industry is competitive and produces a homogenous non-tradable consumption good by
bundling capital, labor, and intermediates using a Cobb-Douglas technology, yF =
(
k (j)
α
l (j)
1−α
)γ
q (j)
1−γ ,
with an intermediate share (1− γ).
The Equilibrium The model outlined above yields an instructive expression for real per-capita income
in country n
yn =
(
Tn
Ωn
) 1−γ
βθ
kαnh
1−α
n , (1)
where Ωn
Ωn = 1−
∑
i6=n
pini.
pini is the share of country n’s total demand for tradables that is met by country i. (1) nicely summarizes
the different determinants of a country’s real per-capita income. As in a standard development accounting
framework (see for example Caselli, 2005) real income depends on endowments, hn and kn, the respective
share α, and TFP represented by (Tn/Ωn)
(1−γ)/(βθ). In contrast to the standard development accounting
framework, however, TFP has a structural interpretation. Whereas Tn is a truly exogenous technology
parameter, Ωn summarizes how much a country gains from trade.
To see this consider a country living in autarky. This country’s trade shares are zero so that Ωautn = 1.
If this country opens up to trade, the trade shares become positive and therefore Ωn < 1. The change
in real income is given by yn/yautn = Ω
−(1−γ)/(βθ)
n . In other words Ω
−(1−γ)/(βθ)
n represents the equivalent
2The equilibrium wage rates, price indices, and trade pattern do not depend on the elasticity of substitution (see Alvarez
and Lucas, 2007), which is why I omit further discussions of the details of the CES aggregator.
3Here and in the following I omit constants that will be irrelevant in the quantification for readability.
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variation with respect to autarky, i.e. the amount of income a country n agent is willing to forgo in order
to avoid autarky. More generally, I can assess welfare changes that are implied by any counterfactual
situation (that does not affect Tn, kn, and hn) by considering the associated change in Ω
−(1−γ)/(βθ)
n .
In order to do that I compute the new trade shares, pini, and based on these the new Ωn. The trade
shares’ structural expressions are
pini =
T˜i
(
wβi P
1−β
i dni
)−θ
∑N
k=1 T˜k
(
wβkP
1−β
k dnk
)−θ ,
where wi is country i’s wage rate, Pi is a CES price index and T˜i = Ti (hi/ki)
−αβθ is a country aggregator
of endowments and technology that is unaffected by the counterfactual experiments performed later on.
Sometimes I will refer to T˜i as country i’s “reduced form technology”. The wage rates and the price
indices are endogenous. The price indices are aggregates of the wages, technologies, price indices, and
bilateral trade costs of all trading partners
Pi =
(
N∑
k=1
T˜k
(
wβkP
1−β
k dik
)−θ)− 1θ
(2)
and the wage rates adjust such that every country’s balance of trade equalizes4
wnhnLn
∑
i 6=n
pini =
∑
k 6=n
piknwkhkLk.
The counterfactual experiments will consider changes in the global matrix of trade costs, {dni}n,i.
Given a quantified version of the model I will first calculate the implied changes of the equilibrium wage
rates and price indices; then compute the implied trade shares and plug them into (1) to quantify the
effect on welfare. For example I could set the bilateral trade costs between some country n and a country
i to infinity, dni → ∞. I then compute the unique set of wage rates that imply price indices and trade
shares such that every country’s balance of trade equalizes.5 Using the associated trade shares in (1) for
country n (country i) (based on the new trade shares) allows me to quantify how much country n would
be willing to pay in order to be able to import (export) from country i (to country n). With experiments
like this the model can be used as a measurement tool to find the sources and magnitudes of Switzerland’s
gains from trade.
4One can show that a country’s total intermediate demand is proportional to this country’s total labor income, which is
why the balance of trade is written in terms of labor income.
5The algorithm is implemented in MATLAB and uses a Tâtonnement-like iterative procedure as outlined in Alvarez
and Lucas (2007). I start with a guess for the equilibrium wage rates. Based on this guess I solve for the price indices
that are implied by (2). Using the wage rates and the corresponding price indices I compute the trade shares and check
if all balances of payments equalize with these trade shares. I increase (decrease) the wages for countries with too large
(low) exports and repeat this procedure until I find the equilibrium vector of wage rates. The program is available from the
author upon request.
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3 Quantifying the model
The model’s parameters are technologies,
{
T˜i
}
i
, trade costs, {dni}n,i, population sizes, {Li}i, endow-
ments, {hi}i,6 and the parameters α, β, γ, and θ. In the following I outline my strategy to quantify these
parameters. In that I follow closely Waugh (2010). I quantify the model based on data from the year
2003 and I use a sample of 86 countries, that together represent 87% of global GDP.7 Details on the data
can be found in the Appendix.
I obtain the population sizes, {Li}i, from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010) and
the human capital endowments, {hi}i, from Caselli (2005). The parameters α = 1/3, β = 1/3, γ = 3/4,
and θ = 4.87 I take from Waugh (2010). In a next step I model the unobserved trade costs as a function
of observable variables
−θ log dni = δk + b+ l + exi + εni,
where I suppressed the associated dummy variables for expositional simplicity. δk (k = 1, ..., 6) is the
effect of the bilateral distance between countries i and n lying in the kth distance interval. The intervals
are (in miles): [0, 375), [375, 750), [750, 1500), [1500, 3000), [3000, 6000), and [6000,∞). b is the effect
of sharing a border and l the effect of having the same language. exi is an exporter fixed effect that
allows for asymmetry in bilateral trade costs and εni captures all other barriers to trade and is assumed
to be orthogonal to the exporter fixed effects, distance, border, and language. I then normalize the
bilateral trade shares, pini, with the home shares of the importers, pinn, to get pini/pinn = d−θni Si/Sn,
where Si = T˜i
(
wβi P
1−β
i dni
)−θ
. Taking logs and plugging in the trade cost function yields a gravity
equation
log
(
pini
pinn
)
= δk + b+ l + exi + logSi − logSn + εni. (3)
In order to empirically implement (3) I need data for pini/pinn, δk, b, and l. logSi can be estimated as a
country fixed effect and exi as an exporter fixed effect. Note that the model restricts the country fixed
effects logSi and logSn to be same for a given country, which is why one can identify the exporter fixed
effect, exi. For the gravity variables on the right hand side (δk, b, and l) I use data from CEPII (2006).
For the left hand side I construct the trade shares pini following the methodology proposed by Eaton and
Kortum (2002). It is important to note that the trade shares measure the value of a trade flow from i to
n relative to the importer n’s total absorption. Whereas it is straightforward to measure the total value
of a trade flow using for example the COMTRADE database, total absorption has to be constructed.
For that I first obtain the gross value of a country’s manufacturing output from UNIDO (2003). I then
subtract the total value of this country’s exports to obtain this country’s demand that is met by local
producers. Adding total imports (from countries in the sample) yields the total value of this country’s
6I do not need data on physical capital, {ki}i since it is absorbed into the reduced form technologies,
{
T˜i
}
i
.
7I choose the year 2003 since there is the largest number of observations of gross output in UNIDO (2003).
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demand, i.e. its absorption. Combining these with the values of the bilateral trade flows gives me the
trade shares (the home share, pinn, follows as a residual). Using these and the gravity variables I can
estimate (3) with OLS. I thus obtain estimates for the trade costs, dni, and the country fixed effects, Si.
Having obtained estimates for the trade costs, the remaining elements of the model that need to be
quantified are the countries’ reduced form technologies,
{
T˜i
}
i
. Remember that the country fixed effects
are Si = T˜i
(
wβi P
1−β
i dni
)−θ
. I have estimates for the trade costs and the fixed effects. Given values
for the wage rates and the price indices I thus could solve for the implied reduced form technologies.
For that I first get the price indices (up to an irrelevant constant) by combining the estimated fixed
effects, Si, and the trade costs, Pn =
(∑N
i=1 Sid
−θ
ni
)−1/θ
. In a next step I obtain the wage rates. I
choose w1 as the numéraire and rewrite the balances of payments for the countries n = 2, ..., N as
wn = pi1n (h1L1) / (hnLn) +
∑N
k=2 piknwk (hkLk) / (hnLn) . Stacking these equations I get a linear system
1− pi22 −pi32 h3L3h2L2 · · · −piN2 hNLNh2L2
...
. . . . . .
...
−pi2N h2L2hNLN · · · −pi(N−1)N
h(N−1)L(N−1)
hNLN
1− piNN


w2
...
wN
 =

pi12
h1L1
h2L2
...
pi1N
h1L1
hNLN
 . (4)
Since I have data on the labor endowments, hnLn, and the constructed the trade shares, pini, I can
solve for the unique set of wage rates that is implied by this system. Using these together with the
previously constructed price indices and the country fixed effects I can back out the technologies, T˜i =
Si
(
wβi P
1−β
i dni
)θ
.
4 The Swiss gains from trade
Having fully quantified the model, I can now turn to the question of this paper. Where do the Swiss
gains from trade originate from and how large are they?
Gains from trade; country by country One can obtain a first idea on the origins of Switzerland’s
gains from trade from equation (1) alone. Clearly, countries with higher trade shares with Switzerland
contribute more to Ωn. Table 1 presents the thus obtained 10 top sources of gains from trade for
Switzerland.
Table 1
The ranking is based on trade shares in non-consumption manufactures since the model is one of trade in
intermediates - all subsequent results are based on non-consumption manufactures. However, the results
are very similar (within 1-2%) if we use only intermediates or total trade instead since the corresponding
trade shares are highly correlated. Switzerland’s top origins of gains from trade are the ones one would
expect ex ante - close European neighbors and the two large countries, USA and China (Japan ranks
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11th).
However, note that the trade shares do not directly mirror the quantitative relevance of a given
country for Switzerland’s gains from trade. Imagine for example a situation where a particular country,
say Germany, was not allowed to trade with Switzerland. Setting the share of Germany in Switzerland’s
imports to zero in equation (1) and using the associated change in Ωn as a measure of Switzerland’s
welfare change would assume that all the varieties that had previously been sourced from Germany are
now produced locally (in Switzerland). But this is of course not what happens, since most varieties will
now simply be sourced from other foreign countries. This is where the structural model becomes relevant
- the reallocation effects can only be quantified based on a general equilibrium model.
Table 2 presents model-based estimates for the magnitudes of Swiss gains from trade with particular
countries. I perform three types of experiments; Column 3 presents the welfare change associated with
inhibiting exports from Switzerland to a given country (dn,CH → ∞); Column 4 presents the welfare
changes when imports are inhibited (dCH,n → ∞); and Column 2 represents the welfare changes when
both - imports and exports - are inhibited (dCH,n = dn,CH →∞).
Table 2
For comparison Column 5 present the “naive” estimates, that simply set the bilateral trade share in (1)
to zero. Clearly, the “naive” estimate strongly overstates the gains associated with being able to trade
with particular countries. This is because the reallocation effects, i.e. importers sourcing varieties in
other foreign countries, are strong. For example, let’s consider a situation where imports from the United
States are inhibited. The “naive” estimate would simply say that the Swiss home share rises by the
United States’ trade share, which corresponds to a 10% increase in the home share. In contrast, if we
account for the reallocation effects using the general equilibrium model, we find that the home share only
increases by 1%, since most goods that have been previously imported from the US are now delivered by
other countries, in particular European neighbors. Correspondingly, the associated welfare loss is much
smaller.
A second finding is, that generally, the welfare gains from being able to import from a country are
larger than the gains from being able to export to this country (except for Canada and Germany). The
gains from being able to import come mainly from lower prices, which translate into lower unit costs
in the production of both final goods and intermediates. The lower unit costs in intermediates in turn
increase demand for Swiss production factors and therewith their remuneration. The gains from being
able to export to a country are due to an increased demand for local production factors and the associated
increase in their remuneration. The Swiss price index, however, is almost unaffected.
A third finding are the rather small gains from trade. Except for the immediate large neighbors
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Germany, France, and Italy, the equivalent variation lies below 1% of the income in the initial situation.
This result is again related to the strong reallocation effects. Were we to consider only finite increases
in the trade costs, the results would even be smaller. This implies that the gains from trade agreements
such as the one currently negotiated with China may be overstated in the public debate. However, a
second class of counterfactual experiments demonstrates that whereas changes in bilateral trade costs do
not matter too much, multilateral changes in trade costs matter very much for Switzerland’s welfare.
The welfare effects of a further European integration A second instructive experiment is con-
cerned with the (indirect) effects of the European integration on Switzerland. Consider for example the
calibrated 2003 world. What is the welfare effect on Switzerland if the trade costs among EU27 countries
uniformly decrease by 25%? To put this in perspective, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) put the
average trade costs among OECD countries at around dni = 1.7. A 25%-reduction thus is a significant
step towards free trade with the new average trade costs lying around 1.27. There are three channels
how this reduction in trade costs affects Swiss welfare. First, the lower trade costs among EU27 countries
implies that the price indices in these countries decrease. Therefore the prices of Switzerland’s imports
decrease as well, which is good for both intermediate and final goods production. Second, the lower trade
costs imply that EU27 production factors are now more productive, so that their remuneration rises,
which in turn tends to increase the prices of Switzerland’s imports. Third, since the trade costs between
EU27 countries and Switzerland are now larger relative to within-EU27 trade costs, EU27 demand is
diverted away from Switzerland - for example there are varieties that Germany previously sourced from
Switzerland but now, due to lower intra-EU27 trade costs buys from France. This reduces demand for
Swiss production factors and therefore lowers the Swiss factor remunerations.
The total effect on Swiss welfare is a decrease in welfare by 3%, i.e. the falling factor remunerations
due to lower demand for Swiss goods and the tendency for higher import prices due to higher factor
prices in the EU27 dominate the tendency for lower prices due to falling price indices in EU27 countries.
How strong are these channels separately? In order to assess the effects on Swiss import prices I first
compute the Swiss price index (2) keeping the wage rates constant but using the new (lower) price indices
of the trading partners. This leads to a decrease of 5% in the price index. If one, on the other hand,
keeps the price indices of the trading partners constant, but uses the new (higher) wage rates one gets an
increase in the price index of 8%. Taken together, the latter effect dominates and the Swiss price index
increases by around 3%. The third effect is trade being diverted away from Switzerland. This leads to
a 8% decrease of factor incomes. Together, the higher price index and the lower incomes in Switzerland
translate into fall in welfare of 3%.
The situation looks very different if Switzerland participates in the trade liberalization. With respect
to the Swiss price index we now have three effects - the lower trade cost, the higher wage rates, and the
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lower price indices of EU27 countries. Using the old wage rates and price indices together with the new
trade costs in (2) leads to a decrease of the Swiss price index by 6%. With the old trade costs and the
old wage rates, but the new EU27 price indices we have a fall of 5%. And if we keep the trade costs and
the price indices constant, but use the new wage rates the price index would rise by 9%. Together these
effects imply a decrease of the Swiss price index by around 1%. Moreover, since the trade costs between
Switzerland and the EU27 countries have now fallen by similar amounts as the intra-EU27 trade costs
demand is not diverted away from Switzerland. And the lower trade costs also imply that factors are now
more productive. Correspondingly the Swiss factor remunerations increase - nominal incomes increase
by 44%.8 Together with the lower price index this translates into a 10% increase in real income and thus
in welfare.
5 Concluding discussion
This paper adopted the Ricardian multi-country trade model as a tool to measure the Swiss gains from
trade with particular countries. It did so by performing counterfactual experiments within a quantified
version of the trade model. The advantage of this approach is its ability to account for general equilibrium
effects. I found that besides Switzerland’s immediate neighbors most countries’ contribution to Swiss
welfare is surprisingly small - the reason for this result are strong reallocation effects. In a second
experiment I found that a large fall in trade costs within the EU leads to a relatively minor welfare loss
in Switzerland. If, however, Switzerland would lower its trade costs with the EU simultaneously, this loss
would turn into a relatively large welfare gain.
What can we learn from these results? The first experiments yield only small gains from being able
to trade with particular countries. Why then should Swiss policy makers bother to negotiate bilateral
free trade agreements such as the one recently initiated with China (Seco, 2011)? Clearly, whereas the
welfare gain for the average Swiss citizen is likely to be small, particular industries may gain a lot. More
importantly, there is a general tendency for falling trade costs due to policy decisions such as free trade
agreements. In the light of the second experiment it is important to avoid a relative rise in Swiss trade
costs. Whereas the gains from bilateral free trade agreements may be small per se, they can be an
important element in a strategy that seeks to keep relative trade costs vis-à-vis other countries constant.
When global trade costs are generally falling this promises relatively large gains for Switzerland. To
summarize, it is always desirable to lower trade costs with trading partners; however, if large trading
blocks increase their integration by lowering within-block trade costs it is crucial and of great economic
benefit if the Swiss keep relative trade costs constant by lowering the bilateral trade costs with the block.
8This number seems to be very high at a first sight. However, note that nominal wages here imply relative to the
numéraire wage, w1, which is the US wage rate in my implementation. The US wage rate in turn falls since they do not
participate in the trade liberatlization. Secondly, as mentioned above, a 25% reduction in intra-EU27 trade costs is a
significant step towards free trade and the wage gains are correspondingly large.
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A Data
The sample consists of 86 countries that together represent 87% of global GDP. This gives rise to
7310=86*85 bilateral trade relations. In the following I describe the data used to quantify the model.
I use the trade shares for non-consumption goods. Alternatively one could use total trade or trade in
intermediates only. The results do barely change since the shares are highly correlated.
A.1 Aggregate values of bilateral trade flows
I use COMTRADE data for 2003 as provided by CEPII (Gaulier, Zignago, Sondjo, Sissoko, and Paillacar,
2010). This data provides the dollar values of the bilateral trade flows between 239 economic entities
(mostly countries) on the HS6 level of aggregation. Summing over all HS6 categories of non-consumption
goods yields the total value of a bilateral trade flow.
A.2 Gross output and manufacturing absorption
I use data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2003) on gross man-
ufacturing output. For the year 2003 this database provides the gross manufacturing output for 77
countries. Unfortunately, the database does not include gross output for several large countries, most
notably Switzerland and China. I therefore choose to impute the gross manufacturing output for coun-
tries that belong to the 20 largest economies in 2003 and for which I do not observe gross manufacturing
output. I do this by following Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004) and scaling value added in the man-
ufacturing sector by the average ratio of gross output and value added across countries. Using bilateral
trade flows I transform the gross output into total manufacturing absorption as described in the main
text. To get at the manufacturing absorption in non-consumption goods only, I proxy their shares in
gross output by the shares in a country’s total exports.
A.3 Bilateral distances, shared border, and common language
All transportation cost proxies are from the database provided by CEPII (CEPII, 2006). The bilateral
distance is measured as the distance between two countries’ most populous cities. The common language
indicator takes the value one if two countries have the same official language9 and common border takes
the value one if two countries share a common land-border.
A.4 Endowments and population sizes
Human capital hi is taken from Caselli (2005) who uses the data of Barro and Lee (2001). These authors
compute human capital as a piece-wise log-linear function of average years of schooling of a country’s
9The results remain basically unchanged when using major languages instead of official languages.
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population over 25 year. Population sizes are taken from the Worldbank’s World Development Indicators
(World Bank, 2010). Note that I do not need data on physical capital stocks, since they are absorbed
into the reduced form technology term, T˜i.
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Table 1: Ranking of contributions to Switzerland’s gains from trade based on observed trade shares
country rank share
Germany 1 14.9
Italy 4 4.0
France 3 4.3
United States 2 4.4
Austria 6 2.0
Netherlands 7 2.0
United Kingdom 9 1.5
Ireland 5 2.5
Belgium and Luxembourg 8 1.6
China and Hongkong 10 1.2
Table 2: Welfare losses associated with inhibited trade with top 10 trading partners
trading partner no trade no exports no imports “naive” estimate
Germany 7.9 4.9 3.3 19.0
France 5.1 2.1 3.2 18.6
Italy 4.5 1.8 3.0 17.8
United Kindom 0.6 0.2 0.4 4.0
Belgium and Luxembourg 0.5 0.2 0.3 3.1
Austria 0.4 0.2 0.3 2.7
The Netherlands 0.3 0.1 0.2 2.3
Spain 0.3 0.1 0.2 2.3
United States 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.4
China 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.9
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